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SUING THE PRESIDENT FOR FIRST
AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS
SONJA R. WEST*
During a rally last fall, President Donald Trump took the surprising step
of launching an attack on NFL players who were participating in the “Take
a Knee” protests of racial injustice and police brutality. 1 The team owners,
he suggested, should respond to the protests by saying, “Get that son of a
bitch off the field right now. Out! He’s fired. He’s fired!”2 The next day,
President Trump followed up that the players should stand for the anthem
or “YOU’RE FIRED. Find something else to do!”3 His tirade continued for
days and included telling the NFL that it “should change [its] policy”
allowing the protests,4 “must respect” his opinion that the protests were
offensive,5 and should “[f]ire or suspend” the players.6 He also called for a
public boycott of NFL games until the players were removed. 7 The
following week, the NFL’s ratings dropped by four percent.8 By spring, the
NFL had announced a new policy of fining teams if their players kneel
during the anthem.9
* Otis Brumby Distinguished Professor of First Amendment Law, University of
Georgia School of Law. I am grateful to Mike Wells for helpful comments and to Michael
Ackerman for his excellent research assistance.
1. Bryan Armen Graham, Donald Trump Blasts NFL Anthem Protesters: ‘Get That
Son of a Bitch off the Field’, GUARDIAN (Sept. 23, 2017, 6:43 PM EDT), https://www.
theguardian.com/sport/2017/sep/22/donald-trump-nfl-national-anthem-protests.
2. Id.
3. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Sept. 23, 2017, 11:11 AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/911654184918880260?lang=en; Donald J. Trump
(@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Sept. 23, 2017, 11:18 AM), https://twitter.com/realDonald
Trump/status/911655987857281024.
4. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Sept. 24, 2017, 3:25 PM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/912080538755846144?refsrc=email&s=11.
5. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Sept. 25, 2017, 4:39 AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/912280282224525312?refsrc=email&s=11.
6. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Sept. 24, 2017, 3:44 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/911904261553950720.
7. See id.
8. Mike Snider, Are NFL Player Protests ‘Massively, Massively’ Hurting TV Ratings?,
USA TODAY (Sept. 26, 2017, 8:05 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/
2017/09/26/nfl-player-protests-hurting-ratings/703619001/.
9. Erik Ortiz, New NFL Policy: Teams to Be Fined if Players Kneel During Anthem,
NBC NEWS (May 23, 2018, 12:05 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/nflannounces-new-national-anthem-policy-fines-teams-if-players-n876816.
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Two weeks before the President’s attacks on the NFL, ESPN reporter
Jemele Hill found herself in the spotlight after she criticized the President in
a series of tweets, including one in which she called him a “white
supremacist.”10 White House Press Secretary Sarah Huckabee Sanders
called the remarks “outrageous” and “a fireable offense.”11 President Trump
later demanded and received an apology from Hill, who was suspended
from her job for two weeks.12
On any given day, it seems, the President of the United States can be
found attacking the press and others because of their speech. And his
attacks are not limited to mere public denouncements or calls for private
action. He also—implicitly and, at times, overtly—has threatened the use of
government power to punish speakers (particularly news organizations) that
displease him. Consider, for example, his repeated targeting of the
Washington Post, a newspaper that he has labeled “fake news”13 and
accused of publishing “false and angry”14 coverage of him. On multiple
occasions, President Trump has linked the newspaper to the online retail
company Amazon through the two companies’ shared owner, Jeff Bezos
(often referring to the paper as the “Amazon Washington Post”).15 During
the campaign, he threatened that if he won the presidency, Amazon was
“going to have such problems.”16 And, indeed, after becoming President,
Trump suggested that Congress look into Amazon’s taxes17 and personally

10. Jemele Hill (@jemelehill), TWITTER (Sept. 11, 2017, 4:54 PM), https://twitter.com/
jemelehill/status/907391978194849793
11. David Nakamura, White House: ESPN’s Jemele Hill Should Be Fired for Calling
Trump a ‘White Supremacist’, WASH. POST (Sept. 13, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/09/13/white-house-espns-jemele-hill-should-be-fired-forcalling-trump-a-white-supremacist/?utm_term=.cb534e4d60a3.
12. See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Sept. 15, 2017, 4:20 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/908651641943003136.
13. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Dec. 19, 2017, 7:07 AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/943135588496093190.
14. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Jan. 28, 2017, 5:08 AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/825329757646618624.
15. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 24, 2017, 7:23 PM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/889672374458646528.
16. Tim Stenovec, Donald Trump Just Said if He’s Elected President Amazon Will Have
Problems, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 26, 2016, 5:14 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/
donald-trump-says-amazon-will-have-such-problems-2016-2
[http://perma.cc/VZ3TAFXR].
17. See Conor Gaffey, Donald Trump vs. Amazon: All the Times the President and Jeff
Bezos Have Called Each Other Out, NEWSWEEK (July 25, 2017, 7:34 AM), http://
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urged the United States Postmaster General to double the delivery rates it
charges the company.18
President Trump likewise has hinted that he would use the powers of his
office against cable and broadcast news organizations. He has called
repeatedly for the government to “look into”19 and “challenge” the FCCgranted licenses of the broadcast television networks.20 President Trump
made it clear, moreover, that he was calling for government investigation
because of the content of the stations’ news coverage, which he deemed
“partisan, distorted and fake”21 and “bad for country.”22 When asked about
these statements at a press conference, he replied, “It is frankly disgusting
the way the press is able to write whatever they want to write . . . . And
people should look into it.”23
Another of the President’s favorite targets is CNN. He has persistently
blasted the cable news organization for its coverage of him, calling it “fake

www.newsweek.com/donald-trump-vs-amazon-jeff-bezos-641506 [http://perma.cc/NG3AUNVC].
18. See Michael D. Shear, Trump, Having Denounced Amazon’s Shipping Deal, Orders
Review of Postal Service, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
business/economy/trump-personally-pushed-postmaster-general-to-double-rates-on-amazonother-firms/2018/05/18/2b6438d2-5931-11e8-858f-12becb4d6067_story.html?utm_term=.ce
6b86fc6456; see also Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Dec. 29, 2017, 5:04
AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/946728546633953285.
19. Noah Bierman & Brian Bennett, Trump Threatens Networks, Saying It’s ‘Disgusting
the Way the Press Is Able to Write Whatever They Want’, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2017, 3:55
PM), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-trump-press-20171011-story.html [http://
perma.cc/B533-HWX8]; Jenna Johnson, Trump Suggests Senate Intelligence Committee
Investigate Media Companies, WASH. POST (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/10/05/trump-suggests-senate-intelligence-committee-inves
tigate-media-companies/?utm_term=.c53bdaedc60e [http://perma.cc/75D8-4DHL].
20. David Shepardson, Trump Suggests Challenging TV Network Licenses over ‘Fake
News’, REUTERS (Oct. 11, 2017, 9:12 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trumpmedia/trump-suggests-challenging-tv-network-licenses-over-fake-news-idUSKBN1CG1WB
[http://perma.cc/BQ8F-TV9U].
21. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Oct. 11, 2017, 5:09 PM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/918267396493922304?lang=en.
22. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Oct. 11, 2017, 6:55 AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/918112884630093825.
23. David Nakamura, Trump Escalates Threats Against Press, Calls News Coverage
‘Frankly Disgusting’, WASH. POST (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/trump-escalates-threats-against-press-calls-news-coverage-frankly-disgusting/2017/
10/11/32996dba-ae9c-11e7-9e58-e6288544af98_story.html?utm_term=.af31e30aee09.
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news”24 and “garbage,”25 and has tweeted memes depicting him attacking a
figure with the CNN logo.26 Late in his campaign, President Trump began
to focus on a proposed merger between AT&T and Time Warner, which
would include the sale of CNN. He told the audience at a campaign rally
that this was “a deal we will not approve in my administration.”27 Sure
enough, after taking office, the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division
filed a lawsuit to block the merger, despite earlier reports that the
department had conditionally approved the sale.28
President Trump’s habit of attacking, threatening, or punishing the press
and other individuals whose speech he dislikes has caught the attention of
First Amendment scholars and lawyers. His actions inevitably raise the
question: Do any of these individuals or organizations (or any future ones)
24. See, e.g., Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 27, 2017, 5:30
AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/879678356450676736 (“Fake News CNN
is looking at big management changes now that they got caught falsely pushing their phony
Russian stories. Ratings way down!”); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER
(Feb. 17, 2017, 1:48 PM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/832708293516632065
(“The FAKE NEWS media (failing @nytimes, @NBCNews, @ABC, @CBS, @CNN) is
not my enemy, it is the enemy of the American People!”).
25. See, e.g., Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 1, 2017, 6:12 AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/881138485905772549 (“I am extremely pleased
to see that @CNN has finally been exposed as #FakeNews and garbage journalism. It’s
about time!”).
26. See Michael M. Grynbaum, Trump Tweets a Video of Him Wrestling ‘CNN’ to the
Ground, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/02/business/media/
trump-wrestling-video-cnn-twitter.html; Jack Moore, After Charlottesville Attack, Trump
Retweets Meme of Train Running over CNN, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 15, 2017, 8:37 AM),
http://www.newsweek.com/after-charlottesville-attack-trump-retweets-meme-train-runningover-cnn-650910; Amy B. Wang, Trump Retweets Image Depicting CNN Squashed Beneath
His Shoe, WASH. POST (Dec. 24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thefix/wp/2017/12/24/trump-retweets-image-depicting-cnn-squashed-beneath-his-shoe/?utm_
term=.9dcef82a1837.
27. See Brian Stelter, Donald Trump Rips into Possible AT&T-Time Warner Deal, CNN
(Oct. 22, 2016, 4:05 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/10/22/media/donald-trump-att-timewarner/index.html.
28. Jim Rutenberg, In AT&T Deal, Government Action Catches Up with Trump
Rhetoric, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/08/business/atttime-warner-cnn-trump.html; Amol Sharma, Snag in Media Merger Stirs Tensions over
Trump-CNN Feud, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 10, 2017, 5:52 PM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/snag-in-media-merger-stirs-tensions-over-trump-cnn-feud-1510354324. The Trump
administration’s attempt to prevent the merger was ultimately unsuccessful. See Cecelia
Kang et al., AT&T Wins Approval for $85.4 Billion Time Warner Deal in Defeat for Justice
Dept., N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/12/business/
dealbook/att-time-warner-ruling-antitrust-case.html.
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have a viable claim against the President for violating their First
Amendment rights? One lawsuit, in fact, has already been filed against
President Trump, alleging that he violated the free speech rights of certain
Twitter users by blocking them from being able to read or comment on his
“@realDonaldTrump” account.29 Remarkably, in response to the lawsuit,
the Department of Justice actually stipulated that the President blocks the
users personally and that he does so because they criticize him or his
policies.30
This type of norm-breaking behavior coming from the President is
unprecedented.31 While other Presidents certainly have had their
disagreements with the press and other critics, they rarely expressed them
so publicly and virtually never attempted such blatant, content-based
retaliation. The harms caused by such actions are immense and may include
monetary, reputational, and emotional damages for the individuals directly
involved as well as the potential widespread chilling of speech for everyone
else.
Chief Justice John Marshall told us in Marbury v. Madison that for every
legal right there is a remedy.32 He also declared that the President of the
United States is not above the law.33 Considering that the United States has
the strongest constitutional protections for free expression in the world and
that First Amendment protection for “core political speech” is “at its

29. Tom McCarthy, Blocked by Trump on Twitter – Now Crusaders Take Their Case to
Court, GUARDIAN (Mar. 7, 2018, 6:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/
mar/07/trump-twitter-first-amendment-legal-case.
30. Joint Stipulation of Facts at 20, Knight First Amendment Inst. v. Trump, No. 17-cv5205 (S.D.N.Y Sept. 25, 2017), https://knightcolumbia.org/sites/default/files/content/Cases/
Twitter/2017.09.25%20Stipulation.pdf. In the interest of full disclosure, I am a signatory to
the First Amendment Legal Scholars’ Amici Curiae Brief in Support of the Plaintiffs’
Motion for Summary Judgment in this case. See Brief of Amici Curiae First Amendment
Legal Scholars in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Knight First
Amendment Inst. v. Trump, No. 17-cv-5205 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2017), https://knight
columbia.org/sites/default/files/content/Cases/Twitter/2017.11.06%20Amicus%20Brief%20%20First%20Amendment%20Scholars.pdf.
31. See RonNell Andersen Jones & Sonja R. West, The Fragility of the Free American
Press, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 567, 568 (2017).
32. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (stating that the “very
essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the
protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury”).
33. Id. at 149 (stating that the President “is a high officer, but he is not above law”).
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zenith,”34 one might think that the ability to sue the President for violation
of the First Amendment would be relatively settled.
The answer, however, is not quite that straightforward. Due to several
unique qualities about the First Amendment and the presidency, it is not
entirely clear if or how citizens can hold the President responsible for
violating their expressive rights. In this Essay, I explore some of the
potential obstacles that face a person or organization bringing a First
Amendment lawsuit against the President.35 In Part I, I consider whether the
President can violate the First Amendment at all; in Part II, I discuss if or
how a plaintiff might recover for that violation. Part III then suggests a few
possible approaches to this problem that could help clarify and secure the
rights of all Americans to seek justice—even against the President—if their
freedoms of speech and press are violated.
I. The President Shall Not Abridge
The initial question in considering a lawsuit against the President for a
First Amendment violation is whether the First Amendment actually applies
to the President. To most Americans—indeed, even to most legal
scholars36—this might seem to be a pedantic, if not downright bizarre,
question. Yet the assertion that the First Amendment applies to actions of
the President stands on less stable legal grounds than we tend to think.
The text of the First Amendment begins with these five words:
“Congress shall make no law.”37 It then, of course, goes on to list a number
of constitutional rights, including the command that “Congress shall make
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”38 It is not
difficult to see the issue here: the First Amendment does not mention the
President.

34. Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 186–87 (1999)
(quotation marks omitted).
35. This Essay does not address additional issues that may arise in such a lawsuit
including those of state action or standing. See, e.g., Leah Litman, State Action Doctrine
Under an Autocrat, TAKE CARE (Sept. 26, 2017), https://takecareblog.com/blog/state-actiondoctrine-under-an-autocrat.
36. See Mark P. Denbeaux, The First Word of the First Amendment, 80 NW. U. L. REV.
1156, 1156 (1986) (discussing that he and “many constitutional and first amendment
scholars had overlooked” the fact that the text of the First Amendment applies only to
Congress).
37. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
38. Id.
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And for a vocal minority of legal scholars, this is a serious problem.39 In
1986, Professor Mark P. Denbeaux was the first to take in-depth, scholarly
note of this issue in his article The First Word of the First Amendment.40
Focusing on whether the First Amendment could prevent judicial prior
restraints on speech, Professor Denbeaux concluded that the proposition
that the First Amendment extends beyond Congress “rest[s] on a shaky
foundation.”41 Other scholars have reached a similar conclusion, stating that
“the First Amendment applies, by its terms, to Congress and not to the
President or the courts”42 and that such a reading “is as textually certain as
is anything in the Constitution.”43 While a relatively small group,
proponents of the strict textualist reading of the First Amendment are quite
adamant. Professor Nicolas Quinn Rosenkranz, for example, has referred to
the collective decision to look away from the word “Congress” at the
beginning of the First Amendment as “hysterical blindness” and argued that
“conventional wisdom . . . willfully ignores the subject of the First
Amendment,” while courts and scholars treat the word “as if it were an
inkblot.”44
These scholars contend that ascertaining the First Amendment’s scope is
straightforward, the result of elementary grammar rules. They claim that
because “Congress” is the amendment’s subject, the subsequent verbal
phrase, “shall not make any law,” must describe Congress, and Congress
alone.45 They point out, moreover, that the Supreme Court has noted this
subject-verb relationship. The Court first invalidated an act of Congress as a
First Amendment violation in the 1965 case Lamont v. Postmaster
General.46 In that case, the Court explicitly noted that “Congress—
39. Daniel J. Hemel, Executive Action and the First Amendment’s First Word, 40 PEPP.
L. REV. 601, 601 (2013) (discussing how “the grammatical subject of the First Amendment
has finally gained attention from constitutional scholars, especially those of a textualist
orientation”).
40. Denbeaux, supra note 36, at 1156.
41. Id. at 1220.
42. Jay S. Bybee, Common Ground: Robert Jackson, Antonin Scalia, and a Power
Theory of the First Amendment, 75 TUL. L. REV. 251, 326 (2000).
43. GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE: TERRITORIAL
EXPANSION AND AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 42–43 (2004) (“That fact may be out of step
with modern sensibilities, but it is a fact nonetheless.”).
44. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 STAN. L. REV.
1209, 1250, 1253, 1255 (2010) (“The first question of First Amendment judicial review must
be: who has violated the First Amendment? And as a matter of text and grammar, there is
only one possible answer: ‘Congress.’”).
45. See, e.g., id. at 1254.
46. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
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expressly restrained by the First Amendment from ‘abridging’ freedom of
speech—is the actor.”47 These scholars likewise note that while other
amendments that do not reference a particular branch provide general
protection from the federal government, the express mention of Congress
binds the First Amendment exclusively to the legislature.48
The history of the amendment, these scholars argue, provides more
support for this interpretation. In his extensive historical examination of the
drafting of the First Amendment, Professor Denbeaux notes that the word
“Congress” was added to the amendment protecting free speech during the
editing process and argues that James Madison, the “Father of the Bill of
Rights,” would not have been so reckless as to include the word
accidentally.49
The most common response of courts and legal scholars to the Congressonly arguments has been silence.50 And the few who have addressed the
question have essentially dismissed it with little more than an academic
wave of the hand.51 According to Professor Denbeaux, the typical response
to this question from constitutional scholars is that the use of the word
“Congress” was merely “an unaccountable slip of the pen by the Founding
Fathers, and that no meaning could be attached to it.”52 In fact, as
Professors Curtis Bradley and Neil Siegel observed, most constitutional
interpreters do not view the language of the First Amendment as even
ambiguous; rather they interpret it as “clearly mean[ing] the opposite of
what it literally seems to say.”53
Yet the federal courts have accepted that the First Amendment applies
beyond Congress and includes the judiciary. In New York Times Co. v.
United States, for example, the Supreme Court held that a federal court
violated the First Amendment when it issued an injunction prohibiting a
newspaper from publishing articles based on the classified Pentagon

47. Id. at 306.
48. Rosenkranz, supra note 44, at 1253.
49. See Denbeaux, supra note 36, at 1171.
50. See Rosenkranz, supra note 44, at 1253 (noting that “with very few exceptions,
scholars have largely ignored the unique subject of the First Amendment”).
51. See Denbeaux, supra note 36, at 1156; see also Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and
Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108
HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1240 n.60 (1995) (raising the question but noting simply that the First
Amendment “has been understood to restrict the executive and judicial branches as well”).
52. Denbeaux, supra note 36, at 1156.
53. Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Constructed Constraint and the Constitutional
Text, 64 DUKE L.J. 1213, 1247 (2015).
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Papers.54 More recently, in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission, the Court noted simply that “[c]ourts, too, are bound by the
First Amendment.”55
At times, the Supreme Court also has applied the First Amendment to
executive branch officers. All of these cases, however, involved lower
executive positions56 and local executive departments.57 For example, in
Pickering v. Board of Education, the Court held that a school board violated
the First Amendment’s free speech clause when a public school teacher was
fired for writing a letter to the editor complaining about the board’s
decision not to increase school taxes and the board’s allocation of funds to
athletics instead of academics.58 In other cases, the application of the First
Amendment can be tied in some way to congressional action. Many cases
involving executive agencies can be explained as involving interpretation of
a congressional statute and, therefore, trigger the First Amendment’s
limitations on Congress.59
The question of whether the First Amendment applies directly to the
President, meanwhile, remains officially unresolved.60 In some instances,
the Supreme Court has appeared to accept that it does but has decided the
case on other grounds such as standing.61 Often, moreover, other
government actors are involved.62
54. 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
55. 558 U.S. 310, 326 (2010); see also Carroll v. President & Comm’rs of Princess
Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 185 (1968) (holding that a ten-day injunction with no notice was
incompatible with the First Amendment).
56. See, e.g., Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988)
(applying the First Amendment to a dispute between Native Americans and the U.S. Forest
Service).
57. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981)
(holding that a state’s withholding of unemployment benefits violated the First
Amendment’s free exercise clause).
58. 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
59. See Hemel, supra note 39, at 610 (discussing the Supreme Court case FCC v. Fox
Television Stations (Fox I), 556 U.S. 502 (2009) and FCC v. Fox Television Stations (Fox
II), 132 S. Ct. 2307 (2012) and arguing that the underlying dispute was ultimately about a
congressional statute “[a]nd since it is the Act itself that establishes this situation, it is the
Act—and thus, Congress—that violates the text of the First Amendment”).
60. Research for this Essay found no case in which the Supreme Court explicitly applied
the First Amendment to the President directly.
61. See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found. Inc., 551 U.S. 587 (2007) (holding
that taxpayers did not have standing to bring an Establishment Clause challenge to a faithbased initiative created by President George W. Bush).
62. In the Twitter case, for example, the district court held that the blocking of Twitter
users from President Trump’s @realDonaldTrump Twitter account violated the First
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Without a doubt, proponents of the Congress-only view of the First
Amendment remain in the minority among courts and constitutional
scholars. But the arguments supporting this reading of the First Amendment
are hardly trivial and have been only lightly debated. Even critics of this
view have acknowledged that it is “original, ingenious, and bracing.”63
Most importantly, because the Court has been known to make exceptions
for the President that it does not make for other federal (and even other
executive branch) officers,64 it is possible that the Court might conclude
that the President should have similar protections from First Amendment
liability. Thus, until the Supreme Court provides clear guidance on this
matter, the questions could continue.
II. For Every Right, There “Might Be” a Remedy
Even assuming the First Amendment does apply to the actions of the
President, challengers could face additional obstacles. A constitutional right
is, of course, of little use if it cannot secure a remedy. 65 Yet the courts have
often been reluctant to apply the typical remedies of First Amendment
litigation to the President.
A. Damages
Individuals who have had their First Amendment rights violated by
government actors typically turn to civil suits for damages as a remedy. As
the Supreme Court has recognized, “Historically, damages have been
regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in
liberty.”66 Yet unlike the issue of whether the First Amendment applies to
the President, the question of whether the courts will force the President to
pay damages if he engages in even the most blatant types of First
Amendment. But the court did not distinguish between the actions of the President and those
of White House Director of Social Media Daniel Scavino, who was also a defendant in the
case. See, e.g., Memorandum and Order at 25, Knight First Amendment Inst. v. Trump, No.
17-cv-5205 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2018) https://knightcolumbia.org/sites/default/files/content/
Cases/Wikimedia/2018.05.23%20Order%20on%20motions%20for%20summary%20judgme
nt.pdf (“[W]e conclude that the control that the President and Scavino exercise over the
account and certain of its features is governmental in nature.”).
63. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Appraising the Significance of the Subjects and Objects of the
Constitution: A Case Study in Textual and Historical Revisionism, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
453, 458 (2013).
64. See infra Section II.A.
65. Without a judicial remedy, moreover, the plaintiffs would also lack constitutional
standing to bring their case. U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 2, cl. 1.
66. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 395 (1971).
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Amendment violation is settled—they will not. Any attempt to seek
damages from the President most likely will be quickly dismissed, because
the Supreme Court has stated that the President enjoys absolute immunity
from liability for civil damages arising out of his official conduct.
The Court addressed this issue in the 1982 case Nixon v. Fitzgerald,67
which involved a First Amendment claim by a former Air Force
management analyst who alleged he was fired in retaliation for his truthful
testimony to Congress.68 He brought his suit against then-President Richard
Nixon, among others, after Nixon stated at a news conference that he
personally had approved the termination of the plaintiff (although the White
House press secretary later claimed that the President misspoke).69 But in a
five-to-four decision, the Court dismissed the case and declared that the
President enjoys absolute immunity from such suits by virtue of his
position.70 This immunity, moreover, extends to the “‘outer perimeter’ of
his official responsibility.”71
Perhaps even more striking than the breadth of the holding in Nixon v.
Fitzgerald is the Court’s reasoning, which embraces a strong view of
presidential exceptionalism.72 In reaching its conclusion, the Court
emphasized several ways that the President is different than other
government actors—even other executive officers like cabinet members or
governors.73 The President, the Court stated, holds “supervisory and policy
responsibilities of utmost discretion and sensitivity”74 in a wide range of
areas and makes the “most sensitive and far-reaching decisions entrusted to
any official under our constitutional system.”75 Because no other executive
officeholder is comparable, the Court explained, other executive officers’
lack of absolute immunity should not inform the extent of presidential
immunity.76 Rather, the “singular importance” of the President’s
responsibilities requires that he not be forced to expend energy, attention,
and resources on private lawsuits.77 The Court, moreover, worried that
67. 457 U.S. 731, 734 (1982).
68. Id. at 736.
69. Id. at 737.
70. Id. at 749.
71. Id. at 756.
72. Id. at 749 (stating the President holds a “unique position in the constitutional
scheme”).
73. Id. at 750, 752.
74. Id. at 750.
75. Id. at 752.
76. Id. at 751.
77. Id.
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saddling the President with this level of potential vulnerability “frequently
could distract a President from his public duties, to the detriment of not
only the President and his office but also the Nation that the Presidency was
designed to serve.”78
The Court also explained that the President requires absolute immunity
from civil damages because of the “sheer prominence” of the office.79 The
President’s visibility to the public makes him “an easily identifiable target
for . . . civil damages.”80 Writing in concurrence, Chief Justice Warren
Burger agreed, warning that, without immunity, private litigation “would
inevitably subject Presidential actions to undue judicial scrutiny as well as
subject the President to harassment.”81
Finally, the Court stated that the constitutional principles of separation of
powers favored presidential privilege.82 Before a federal court may exercise
jurisdiction over the President, the Court explained, it must “balance the
constitutional weight of the interest to be served against the dangers of
intrusion on the authority and functions of the Executive Branch.”83 There
are only two situations, the Court suggested, in which it had exercised
jurisdiction over the President: situations concerning broad public
interests84 or criminal prosecutions.85 A “merely private suit for damages
based on the President’s official acts,” the Court held, did not meet this
high bar.86 Again, Chief Justice Burger agreed, stating that although
individuals may have been actually injured, “the need to prevent large-scale
invasion of the Executive function by the Judiciary far outweighs the need
to vindicate the private claims.”87
Despite cutting off individuals’ ability to seek damages against the
President for constitutional violations, the Court assured us that its holding
does not leave us without remedy against presidential wrongdoing.88 Other
formal and informal avenues remain, it stated, such as impeachment, press
scrutiny, congressional oversight, reelection pressure, the President’s

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 753.
Id. at 752.
Id. at 753.
Id. at 762 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
Id. at 753 (majority opinion).
Id. at 754.
Id. (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)).
Id. (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)).
Id.
Id. at 762 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
Id. at 757 (majority opinion).
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incentive “to maintain prestige,” and “a President’s traditional concern for
his historical stature.”89
Fifteen years later, however, the Court revisited the issue of civil suits
against the President in Clinton v. Jones.90 In that case, Paula Jones sued
then-President Bill Clinton and raised a variety of claims arising out of
alleged acts of sexual harassment that occurred before he became
President.91 Clinton claimed immunity under Fitzgerald, but a unanimous
Court disagreed.92 The President, the Justices stated, was not immune from
suits based on events occurring before he was in office, because they are
“beyond the scope of any action taken in an official capacity.”93
But the Jones case is likely of little help for a plaintiff raising free speech
or free press claims. In order to show a First Amendment violation, such a
plaintiff would need to prove state action and, thus, argue that the President
was acting in his capacity as a government actor. This showing would seem
to be in direct conflict with an effort to show that the President was not
acting within the outer limits of his official capacity and thus was not
immune.
Other government actors enjoy immunity from civil damages in select
situations, but the scope of the President’s immunity appears to stand alone
in its breadth. By emphasizing the uniqueness of the President’s duties and
vulnerability, the Court has made clear that the bar for maintaining a civil
suit against the President is formidable. Concerns about violating the
separation of powers, moreover, also give the Court pause about imposing
judgment on our chief executive.
B. Injunctions and Declaratory Judgments
With civil damages off the table, First Amendment plaintiffs are left with
virtually no other option than to seek injunctive relief. In the lawsuit
challenging President Trump’s practice of blocking critical Twitter users,
for example, the plaintiffs have asked the court for a declaration that the
President’s blocking of them from his Twitter account is unconstitutional
and an injunction mandating that he unblock their accounts and refrain from

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
520 U.S. 681 (1997).
Id. at 685.
Id. at 696.
Id. at 694.
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doing so again in the future.94 Once again, however, we find ourselves with
a question of courts’ power over the presidency that remains unresolved.
In the Twitter case, the Department of Justice argued to the district court
that the plaintiffs’ case is nonjusticiable because the federal courts lack the
power to enjoin the President.95 For support, the Department relied on the
150-year-old Supreme Court case Mississippi v. Johnson, in which the state
of Mississippi challenged a series of statutes known as the Military
Reconstruction Act that would have imposed military rule on the
Confederate states until they allowed black men to vote and ratified the
Fourteenth Amendment.96 The lawsuit sought an injunction prohibiting
then-President Andrew Johnson from executing and enforcing the Act. But
the Court refused to grant injunctive relief, stating that it had “no
jurisdiction of a bill to enjoin the President in the performance of his
official duties; and that no such bill ought to be received by us.”97 While the
Court conceded that it could force the President to comply with
“ministerial” duties in which there was “no room for the exercise of
judgment,” it stated that “general principles . . . forbid judicial interference
with the exercise of Executive discretion.”98
The Department further argued that the Court reaffirmed this general
principle in the 1992 case Franklin v. Massachusetts.99 Speaking for a
plurality of four Justices, Justice O’Connor questioned whether the district
court in that case had the power to issue an injunction against the
President.100 While acknowledging that the Court might have the power to
enjoin the President regarding a “purely ‘ministerial’ duty” and may issue a
subpoena in an ongoing criminal investigation, Justice O’Connor stated that
“in general” it could not issue an injunction against the President in matters
pertaining to his official duties.101 Such an order would be “extraordinary,”
she wrote, and “should . . . raise[] judicial eyebrows.”102 Ultimately,
94. Complaint at 25, Knight First Amendment Inst. v. Trump, No. 17-cv-5205
(S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2017) https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3892179/2017-07-11Knight-Institute-Trump-Twitter.pdf.
95. Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Knight First
Amendment Inst. v. Trump, No. 17-cv-5205 (S.D.N.Y Oct. 13, 2017), https://knight
columbia.org/sites/default/files/content/Knight_v_Trump_WH_opening_brief.pdf.
96. 71 U.S. (1 Wall.) 475, 475 (1867).
97. Id. at 501.
98. Id. at 499.
99. 505 U.S. 788 (1992).
100. Id. at 802.
101. Id. at 802–03.
102. Id. at 802.
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however, she held that the issue could be resolved without reaching this
question.103 Meanwhile, Justice Scalia, who did not join Justice O’Connor’s
plurality, wrote separately to state explicitly that the Court did not have the
power to issue injunctive relief against the President.104 Such an order, he
suggested, would be “incompatible with his constitutional position that he
be compelled personally to defend his executive actions before a court.”105
The debate, however, continues. A group of federal court scholars
weighed in as amici curiae in the Twitter case and argued that the
government was misreading Mississippi v. Johnson.106 That case, they
contended, “did not hold what the Government is arguing now—that there
is something unique about the President as a litigant that requires complete
judicial abdication.”107 Instead, the scholars stated, courts and
commentators today understand Johnson to be one of series of rulings that
set the stage for what we now refer to as the political question doctrine.108
Both sides, moreover, supported their arguments by pointing to cases in
which federal courts either have issued109 or have refused to issue110
declaratory relief against the President. In a blog post discussing the Twitter
case, Professor Stephen Vladeck (who was a signatory to the Federal Courts
Scholars’ brief111) suggested that the question of whether the courts can
enjoin the President “may well depend upon the specific facts of each

103. Id. at 803.
104. Id. at 826 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
105. Id. at 827.
106. Brief for Federal Courts Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs at 2, Knight
First Amendment Inst. v. Trump, No. 17-cv-5205 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2017), https://knight
columbia.org/sites/default/files/content/Cases/Twitter/2017.11.06%20Amicus%20Brief%20%20Federal%20Courts%20Scholars.pdf.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See Brief for Federal Courts Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs, supra
note 106, at 8–11.
110. See Plaintiffs’ Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Cross-Motion
for Summary Judgment at 10 n.5, Knight First Amendment Inst. v. Trump, No. 17-cv-5205
(S.D.N.Y Dec. 1, 2017), https://knightcolumbia.org/sites/default/files/content/Cases/
Twitter/ECF%20No.%2056%20-%20Pls.'%20SJ%20Reply%20Br.pdf; Memorandum of
Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 9, Knight First Amendment Inst. v.
Trump, No. 17-cv-5205 (Oct. 13, 2017), https://knightcolumbia.org/sites/default/files/
content/Knight_v_Trump_WH_opening_brief.pdf.
111. Brief for Federal Courts Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs, supra note
106.
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individual dispute.”112 An appropriate case for injunctive relief, he stated,
would be one “in which all of the equitable factors militate in favor of such
relief, in which no subordinate can be enjoined to produce the same result,
and in which the dispute is otherwise justiciable.”113
The district court in the Twitter case ruled against President Trump,114
and the government is appealing.115 In her ruling, Judge Naomi Reice
Buchwald rejected the Department of Justice’s argument that the courts
lack any power to enjoin the President and suggested that a court order
requiring the President to unblock individual Twitter users would have only
“minimal” effect on his executive prerogatives.116 She stated that “we find
entirely unpersuasive the Government’s parade of horribles regarding the
judicial interference in executive affairs presented by an injunction
directing the President to comply with constitutional restrictions.”117
Nonetheless, she did not issue an injunction and, instead, concluded that
declaratory relief would be sufficient.118
If enjoining the President does involve a balancing approach of sorts, the
question then becomes how that balance tips in cases involving violations
of individual First Amendment rights. In Fitzgerald, the Court stated that it
needed to balance the constitutional interest against the potential impact of
a court order on the work of the President.119 For when judicial action
against the President would serve “broad public interests,” the Court
explained, such action does not violate the separation of powers but helps
maintain the “proper balance” between the branches.120 Because the Court
was concerned about the “personal vulnerability” of the President to
damage suits, it is possible that the Court would consider claims for

112. Steve Vladeck, Do Federal Courts Lack the Power to Directly Enjoin the
President?, JUST SECURITY (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/44201/federalcourts-lack-power-enjoin-president/.
113. Id.
114. See Memorandum and Order, supra note 62, at 1.
115. See Notice of Appeal, Knight First Amendment Inst. v. Trump, No. 17-cv-5205
(S.D.N.Y June 4, 2018), https://knightcolumbia.org/sites/default/files/content/Trump
Twitter%20-%20ECF%20No.%2073%20-%20Defs.'%20Notice%20of%20Appeal.pdf
116. See Memorandum and Order, supra note 62, at 70.
117. See id. at 72.
118. The plaintiffs in the case have reported that they were unblocked from the
@realDonaldTrump account soon after the court’s ruling. Nick Jack Pappas (@Pappiness),
TWITTER (June 4, 2018, 9:20 PM), https://twitter.com/Pappiness/status/100385402
3433359360.
119. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 754 (1982).
120. Id.
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injunctive relief to be less burdensome on the executive function. Then
again, the fact that Fitzgerald itself involved an allegation of a free speech
violation might suggest that such First Amendment claims do not, in the
eyes of the Court, serve sufficiently broad public interests.
III. Securing the Right to Sue
Nothing in the preceding discussion is meant to suggest that the
President is—or should be—immune from lawsuits alleging First
Amendment violations. To the contrary, it is entirely unacceptable for the
President to be allowed to violate individuals’ free speech and free press
rights. The harms to both the speakers involved and the public at large are
deeply concerning. A President who is free to use the power of his pulpit
and his office to censor, silence, and chill critical speech violates our most
basic principles of free expression.
Until recently, however, the tacit pressures of political norms have
managed to keep these harms largely in check. The problem, of course, is
that violating longstanding norms and traditions appears to be one of
President Trump’s favorite pastimes. Indeed, he has shown little concern
for our country’s traditions of an uninhibited and robust public debate.
Thus, the ability of private individuals and groups to stand up to the
President in the face of First Amendment violations is just one of several
ways in which President Trump is putting our Constitution through a legal
stress test. Luckily, while the path for suing the President for First
Amendment violation is, in many ways, uncharted, the strongest arguments
are on the side of the speakers.
In this Part, I conclude by offering a few thoughts on how to best secure
the rights of free expression through a careful drafting of claims,
constitutional interpretation, reliance on precedent, and possible legislative
action.
A. Constitutional Workarounds
It is entirely possible that the issue of whether the First Amendment even
applies to the President will end not with a bang but a whimper. The stricttextualist argument remains a fringe theory and is rarely mentioned, let
alone thoroughly analyzed. The courts have applied the amendment to the
judiciary and to lower executive actors with little to no discussion of the
textual issue. The Court may do the same with the presidency and simply
enforce the First Amendment against the President without fanfare. In fact,
the Court recently signaled that it might take such a path when it agreed to
hear a challenge to the latest version of President Trump’s “travel ban”
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against several predominantly Muslim countries. In its order granting
certiorari, the Court specifically asked the parties to address whether the
executive order violates the Establishment Clause. Throughout the briefing
and oral argument, moreover, neither the Court nor the Department of
Justice raised the strict-textualist argument.121 Ultimately, the Court held
that the executive order did not violate the First Amendment.122 In doing so,
it concluded that a variety of statements President Trump made, which the
plaintiffs argued showed that there was religious animus behind the order,
were not relevant.123 Instead, the Court stated that judicial deference to the
executive was required.124
If the Congress-only argument is raised, the blueprint for rebutting it can
be found in a rare judicial analysis of the issue by then-Judge Michael
McConnell of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in the 2006 case Shrum v.
City of Coweta.125 In that case, which involved a First Amendment
challenge against a city police chief, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the
amendment does apply to executive action.126 Although the inclusion of the
word “Congress” at the beginning of the First Amendment was intentional,
the court stated, the drafters did not mean to allow the other two branches to
interfere with free speech.127 The court instead suggested that the framers of
the First Amendment included the language about Congress for two
reasons: “[T]o limit the reach of the First Amendment . . . to the federal
government, and to set forth these freedoms as a freestanding Bill of Rights,
separate from the main body of the constitutional document.”128
The court linked the amendment’s wording to an early version of the
religious liberty draft amendment, which originally read, “no religion shall
be established by law, nor shall the equal rights of conscience be
infringed.”129 According to the court, ambiguous wording scared a
representative from Connecticut, who sought to ensure the survival of his

121. Amy Howe, Justices to Review Travel Ban Challenge, SCOTUS BLOG (Jan. 19,
2018, 3:53 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/01/justices-review-travel-ban-challenge/.
122. Trump v. Hawaii, No. 17-965, slip op. at 38 (U.S. June 26, 2018) (Roberts, C.J.).
123. Id. at 13.
124. Id. at 31. Furthermore, the lawsuit also was brought against other lower executive
actors. Thus, even if the Court had ruled the other way, it potentially could have avoided
addressing the question of enjoining the President.
125. 449 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 2006).
126. Id. at 1140.
127. Id. at 1142.
128. Id. at 1141.
129. Id. at 1142.
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state’s compulsory taxation in support of an official church.130 In response
to the congressman’s expressed concern that federal lawsuits would hinder
Connecticut’s longstanding establishment of religion, the drafting
committee added the words “Congress shall make no law” to the proposed
amendment.131
Professor Denbeaux and others have characterized this response as a
means of ensuring that federal courts could rule in favor of an established
religion if the state law was ever challenged.132 But the Tenth Circuit was
not convinced; instead, it asserted that the framers intended to remove any
doubt as to the First Amendment’s inapplicability to state governments. 133
Professor Akhil Amar agrees that the amendment was designed to limit the
federal government but not the states, arguing that only Congress was
prohibited from making a law because only Congress had been granted
lawmaking powers.134
The court’s opinion also highlighted how the legislature interpreted the
language less than half a century later. A mere four and a half decades after
the passage of the Bill of Rights, the Senate “roundly rejected” and
“ridicule[d]” a suggestion made by Senator Gabriel Moore that the First
Amendment applied only to laws passed by Congress because of the
Amendment’s plain language.135 Professor Eugene Volokh, moreover, later
identified three cases from the same time period in which federal courts
appeared to consider themselves bound by the First Amendment.136 Of
course, a committed textualist might dismiss both the Tenth Circuit and
Professor Denbeaux’s findings and “say that the plain meaning of the First
Amendment trumps, whether or not the plain meaning comports with what
the drafters had in mind.”137
Even if the strict-textualist approach to the First Amendment gains
unexpected traction, though, another constitutional provision might
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Denbeaux, supra note 36, at 1169.
133. Shrum, 449 F.3d at 1142.
134. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 319 (2005) (“By
turning Article I’s ‘Congress shall . . . make all Laws’ language into ‘Congress shall make
no law’ phraseology, the First Amendment underscored that Congress lacked authority under
the necessary-and-proper clause, or any other Article I enumeration, to censor expression in
the states.”).
135. Shrum, 449 F.3d at 1142.
136. Eugene Volokh, Tort Liability and the Original Meaning of the Freedom of Speech,
Press, and Petition, 96 IOWA L. REV. 249, 257–58 (2010).
137. Hemel, supra note 39, at 604.
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accomplish the same goal—the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
There is no question that executive branch officials cannot deprive any
person “of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Therefore,
“if the First Amendment forbids the making of ‘law’ that infringes the
freedom of speech,” the Tenth Circuit explained, “and the Due Process
Clause forbids the executive from taking away liberties except pursuant to
‘law,’ it follows that the First Amendment protects against executive as
well as legislative abridgement.”138 Others agree that it is a substantive due
process violation when the President violates the First Amendment.
Professor Daniel Hemel, for example, suggests that many cases alleging
that the executive branch has violated the First Amendment should be
recast as due process violations.139 But, he states, “the practical result is the
same in either event.”140
The Due Process Clause might also provide a route to trace the First
Amendment violation back to Congress. Professor Hemel suggests that
many First Amendment violations by executive actors are rooted in a power
bestowed by statute.141 Thus, as Professor David Strauss described the
argument, “If Congress has authorized the President to abridge the freedom
of speech, then Congress has violated the First Amendment.”142 In the case
of President Trump, however, this approach is unlikely to help, because his
questionable acts tend to occur as part of his independent speech.
Most likely, plaintiffs will need to do nothing more than rely on the
longstanding and widely held conviction that the First Amendment includes
the President. This interpretation is so strongly recognized, several scholars
have argued, that it is built “in the fabric of the law.”143 The Congress-only
idea, according to Professor Jack Balkin, simply does not make sense
“either at the time of the founding or today.”144 And any other conclusion,
Professor Strauss argued, “would require a radical revision of several wellestablished doctrines.”145

138. Shrum, 449 F.3d at 1143.
139. Hemel, supra note 39, at 605.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. David A. Strauss, Foreword: Does the Constitution Mean What It Says?, 129 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 32 (2015).
143. Id. at 61.
144. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 205 (2011).
145. Strauss, supra note 142, at 34 n.181.
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Nonetheless, given the uncertainty that exists, the safest move would be
for plaintiffs to include both a First Amendment claim and a Fifth
Amendment due process claim.
B. Rethinking Precedent
While the strict-textualist reading of the First Amendment may be a
distant threat, the issue of finding a remedy against the President is,
perhaps, less remote. Indeed, the Department of Justice raised the lack-ofremedy argument in the Twitter case.146 At first blush, the Department’s
argument appears strong. The Court was quite clear in Nixon v. Fitzgerald
that monetary damages were not available in matters related to the
President’s official acts.147 And in Mississippi v. Johnson, the Court stated
that courts lack jurisdiction “to enjoin the President in the performance of
his official duties.”148
A closer examination of precedent on this issue, however, reveals that
the Court’s holdings and analysis in these cases is more nuanced than the
Department suggests. As the federal courts scholars explain in their brief,
contrary to what the Department suggests, the Johnson case does not
support a broad rule prohibiting the courts from enjoining the President.149
Rather, the decision as it is widely understood reflects “the hesitance of the
judiciary to wade into a significant interbranch dispute in the fragile
aftermath of the Civil War”150 and “cannot be divorced from its historical
context.”151
What the Court’s precedents suggest, the scholars argue, is not a rule of
blanket presidential immunity from injunctions, but simply a reminder to
the courts to proceed thoughtfully.152 The power of the courts to enjoin the
President “is rarely exercised for reasons grounded in judicial prudence and
comity—respect for the office of the Presidency demands it.”153
Practically, moreover, it often makes sense for such cases to be brought
against defendants other than the President if possible.154 But the Court in
146. Vladeck, supra note 112.
147. 457 U.S. 731, 754 (1982).
148. 71 U.S. 475, 501 (1867).
149. Brief for Federal Courts Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs, supra note
106.
150. Id. at 2.
151. Id. at 3.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1.
154. See Jonathan R. Siegel, Suing the President: Nonstatutory Review Revisited, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 1612, 1686 (1997) (discussing the practice of nonstatutory review).
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Clinton v. Jones affirmed that “it is settled law that the separation-ofpowers doctrine does not bar every exercise of jurisdiction over the
President of the United States.”155 And as the federal courts scholars stated,
“[T]he fact that courts should proceed cautiously before exercising
equitable power over the President directly does not mean that courts lack
such power, or that they may not exercise it in an appropriate case in which
no other means exist to enforce federal law.”156
The potential First Amendment claims against President Trump arguably
are just the types of “appropriate cases” the scholars describe. The President
often has acted alone and, thus, there may be no subordinate officer
involved. Therefore, only the President can provide an effective remedy.
Even in the context of civil damages, the Court’s reasoning in Nixon v.
Fitzgerald supporting the wisdom of expansive presidential immunity is
proving to be flawed. The Court in Fitzgerald assured us that shielding the
President from civil lawsuits “will not leave the Nation without sufficient
protection against misconduct on the part of the Chief Executive.”157 Yet
several of the Court’s suggested checks on the President’s behavior now
sound dubious.
The Court, for example, suggested that the people have the ability
(through their elected representatives) to impeach the President.158 But the
threat of impeachment is extreme and seems unlikely to be utilized by
Congress or to deter the President. The Court also proposed that more
informal checks offer sufficient protection. These include the “constant
scrutiny” of the press and “vigilant oversight” by Congress. The Court also
relies on the President’s desire to win reelection and “maintain prestige,” as
well as “a President’s traditional concern for his historical stature.”159 In the
Court’s view, these checks will apply with greater force to the President
than to other government officials.160
Yet these types of protections against presidential misconduct work on
the assumption that the President will follow constitutional and political
norms—the exact kind of norms President Trump blatantly disregards. The
current climate exposes just how insufficient such soft pressures are when
155. 520 U.S. 681, 705 (1997) (quoting Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 753–54
(1982)).
156. Brief for Federal Courts Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs, supra note
106, at 2.
157. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 757.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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faced with a President determined to use the full power of his office to
silence critics.
Perhaps most importantly, the Court in Fitzgerald failed to consider the
unique importance of protecting expressive rights from presidential abuse.
Instead, the Court declared broad presidential immunity that would apply to
all types of private claims for damages.161 But relying on political checks to
protect expressive rights is especially problematic. Political checks, by their
nature, are contingent upon the existence of an informed populace and a
public debate that is “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”162 This public
debate, moreover, might include “vehement, caustic, and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.”163
Likewise, a free press “plays a unique role as a check on
government abuse”164 and “will often serve as an important restraint on
government.”165 If the President is free to stifle, censor, or chill free speech
and a free press, the political process becomes a less effective safeguard.
To the Fitzgerald Court, the President’s immense power and
responsibilities increased the need to protect him from civil suits. Yet the
opposite is true when it comes violations of expressive rights. The
President’s unparalleled power and ability to make exceedingly important
decisions about national security, economic policy, military action, and
social matters is exactly why he should not be free to stifle his critics. As
the Court explained in the 1977 case Butz v. Economou, in which it rejected
absolute immunity for all federal officials exercising discretion,
[Absolute immunity for] the greater power of such officials
affords a greater potential for a regime of lawless conduct.
Extensive Government operations offer opportunities for
unconstitutional action on a massive scale. In situations of abuse,
an action for damages against the responsible official can be an
important means of vindicating constitutional guarantees.166
If the Court remains concerned about the potential financial burden of
suits for monetary damages against the President, it could instead award
only nominal damages. Nominal damages, as Professor Helen Norton has
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
(1983).
166.

Id.
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
Id.
Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991).
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585
438 U.S. 478, 506 (1978).
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explained, “can serve both expressive and deterrent functions.”167 In the
context of suits against state actors, for example, the Court has observed
that awards of nominal damages can show that “the law recognizes the
importance to organized society that those rights be scrupulously
observed.”168
C. Congressional Statute
Finally, perhaps the most effective way to secure the right to sue the
President for First Amendment violations would be for Congress to speak
up. Congress could pass a statute that provides a vehicle for suits seeking
recovery against the President for First Amendment violations arising out of
his official conduct.
Congressionally created causes of action against government actors for
constitutional violations are, of course, common. The most prominent arise
out of section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,169 which allows
individuals to sue state and local officials for monetary damages when their
constitutional rights are violated. Congress has never passed a federal
counterpart to section 1983, however, and instead plaintiffs who wish to sue
federal officers for constitutional violations usually must rely on a theory
articulated by the Court in the 1971 case Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal
Narcotics Agents.170 In Bivens, the Court inferred a cause of action for
monetary damages against a federal official if no other federal action
provided a remedy.171 Bivens, however, involved a Fourth Amendment
violation, and the Court has never held that Bivens extends to First
Amendment claims.172 Even if it did, moreover, the Court’s decision in
Nixon v. Fitzgerald would appear to prevent such suits against the
President.

167. Helen Norton, Remedies and The Government’s Constitutionally Harmful Speech, 9
CONLAWNOW 49, 61 (2018); see also JAMES PFANDER, CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS AND THE
WAR ON TERROR xviii (2017) (“[T]he federal courts should focus on the narrow (but
supremely important) task of evaluating the legality of official conduct.”).
168. Cary v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978).
169. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law . . . .”).
170. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
171. Id. at 397.
172. Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 663 (2012).
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But if Congress provided an explicit statutory cause of action, this could
change. The Fitzgerald Court specifically left open the question of whether
the President would have immunity “if Congress expressly had created a
damages action against the President of the United States.”173 Instead, the
Court concluded, “our holding today need only be that the President is
absolutely immune from civil damages liability for his official acts in the
absence of explicit affirmative action by Congress.”174
This hesitation to infer a cause of action against the President without
clear guidance from Congress is consistent with other areas of law. When
considering the scope of the Administrative Procedure Act, for example, the
Court was reluctant to assume that the Act applied to the President without
“an express statement by Congress.”175 As the Court explained, “Out of
respect for the separation of powers and the unique constitutional position
of the President, we find that textual silence is not enough to subject
the President to the provisions of the APA.”176
It is possible that an explicit statement from Congress would still not
resolve the Court’s separation of powers concerns,177 but the Court’s
approach to Bivens claims has shown that it is primarily concerned with the
separation of powers between the judicial and the legislative branches—not
the executive.178 Congress should, therefore, make it clear that it is
unacceptable for the President of the United States to violate First
Amendment rights.
Conclusion
The freedoms of speech and press protected by the First Amendment are
among our most cherished constitutional liberties. They function, moreover,
as an important structural check on our most powerful government actors.
There is, of course, no single government actor in the United States who is
more powerful than the President, making the right to comment on or
173. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 784 n.27 (1982).
174. Id.
175. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800–01 (1992).
176. Id.
177. See Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 792 (White, J, dissenting) (“We are never told, however,
how or why congressional action could make a difference. It is not apparent that any of the
propositions relied upon by the majority to immunize the President would not apply equally
to such a statutory cause of action; nor does the majority indicate what new principles would
operate to undercut those propositions.”).
178. See Anya Bernstein, Congressional Will and the Role of the Executive in Bivens
Actions: What Is Special About Special Factors?, 45 IND. L. REV. 719, 722 (2012).
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criticize him and his policies all the more vital. Yet without an effective
way to sue the President for First Amendment violations, he would be free
to silence and intimidate critics. Political checks, moreover, have proven
ineffective and leave individual plaintiffs without a remedy for their
personal harms. When considering First Amendment lawsuits against the
President, the courts should take into account the potential damage to our
public debate if the President cannot be held accountable for violating the
expressive rights of the people.
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